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1 Introduction
Rudolf Carnap’s contributions to logic prior to his Logische Syntax der Sprache
(1934) consist, among other things, of work on the formalization of mathematical the-
ories and their metamathematical investigation. His main contributions to this topic
are contained in his logic textbook Abriss der Logistik (1929) and the manuscript
Untersuchungen zur Allgemeinen Axiomatik, written in Vienna around 1928, but un-
published until the edition (Carnap 1928/2000).1 Carnap’s study of the metatheory
of axiomatic theories developed in these texts remains interesting today. On the one
hand, it is highly original, especially given the fact that his results were formulated
prior to Go¨del’s incompleteness results and to Tarski’s work on truth and logical con-
sequence from the mid-1930s. It thus illustrates Carnap’s still often neglected con-
tributions to the development of modern logic. On the other hand, his approach has
interesting points of contact with parallel contributions to logic from the same period.
This concerns, in particular, Tarski’s earlier work on the “methodology of the deduc-
tive sciences”, from the 1920s and early 1930s. Like Tarski, Carnap aims to give an
explication of several metatheoretical concepts that play a role in modern axiomatics
and to specify their logical relations.
The general aim of the present paper is to reassess Carnap’s resulting proposals in
Untersuchungen and Abriss.2 To do this, we articulate—in more detail than the lit-
erature on this topic has done so far—the logical machinery of and the conceptual
1 Carnap presented the main results of his Untersuchungen manuscript at the First Conference on Epis-
temology of the Exact Sciences, August 1929, in Prague. Already at the end of 1928/beginning of 1929, he
considered submitting a version of the manuscript for publication, and circulated it to mathematicians and
logicians, including Baer, Behmann, Go¨del, Ha¨rlen, and Fraenkel; see Awodey and Carus (2001), note 1.
Behmann provided extensive comments; some of his marginalia are preserved in one of the versions of the
typescript in Carnap’s papers (ASP RC 080–34–02), and longer comments in Behmann’s papers (Staats-
bibliothek zu Berlin, Nachlaß 335 (Behmann), K. 1 I 10). Behmann at first suggested the manuscript was
not ready to be published in a pure mathematics journal, but withdrew these objections after closer reading
in March 1929. However, Carnap delayed revision of the manuscript and eventually, in 1930, abandoned
the plan to publish it, essentially after some conversations with Tarski during his first visit to Vienna;
see Reck (2007). The edition (Carnap 1928/2000) includes items RC 080–34–02, 080–34–03, and 080–
34–04 from Carnap’s papers, with uniformized page, section, and theorem numbering. These original items
are now available online from the Archives of Scientific Philosophy (www.library.pitt.edu/rudolf-carnap-
papers). We provide references to both the (out-of-print) edition and the original typescripts. Carnap’s work
on general axiomatics is also documented in Carnap (1927, 1930) and Carnap and Bachmann (1936). For
a general overview of logical work on axiom systems before Carnap, see Mancosu et al (2009).
2 Carnap’s more general views on logic were in flux during the 1920s and early 30s, especially after
he encountered Hilbert (1928), Hilbert and Ackermann (1928), Go¨del (1929), and Tarski’s early meta-
logical work. Our discussion focuses on Carnap (1928/2000) and Carnap (1929), two texts that were
composed largely before those influences became dominant. It should be noted, however, that Carnap
followed the developments of logic in Hilbert’s school closely even before the appearance of Hilbert and
Ackermann’s textbook. In fact, the Abriss was originally conceived as a joint project with Hilbert’s student
Heinrich Behmann in the early 1920s. However, Behmann came to prefer his own, more algebraic no-
tation (see Mancosu and Zach 2015), while Carnap thought the Peano-Russell-Whitehead notation made
popular by Principia was preferable for a textbook presentation (Carnap to Behmann, February 19, 1924,
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Nachlaß 335 (Behmann), K. 1 I 10). For additional historical background, see
Awodey and Carus (2001), Awodey and Reck (2002a), and Reck (2004, 2007). A broader study of the
evolution of Carnap’s metatheory up to and beyond the 1930s cannot be undertaken here; it deserves a
separate paper.
Carnap’s Early Metatheory: Scope and Limits 3
assumptions behind Carnap’s attempt to formulate the metatheory of axiomatic theo-
ries in a type-theoretic framework. This involves addressing questions such as the fol-
lowing: How precisely did Carnap explicate metalogical notions in Untersuchungen,
such as those of model, logical consequence, and completeness? In which ways are
the results related to similar contributions by his contemporaries Behmann, Fraenkel,
Hilbert, and Tarski, among others? In what ways does his account differ most sig-
nificantly from today’s metalogic? And are there any important structural similarities
between them, despite the conceptual differences?
In pursuing this objective, we focus on three characteristic features of Carnap’s ap-
proach in Untersuchungen that distinguish it from metalogic as practiced today, at
least at first glance. The first feature concerns the fact that a clear-cut distinction be-
tween semantics and proof theory is still missing in Carnap’s text, as becomes evident
at various points. The second feature to be reconsidered is his particular type-theoretic
approach: Carnap attempts to use the same logical language both for formulating ax-
iom systems and their consequences and for formulating metatheoretic concepts and
metatheorems about such systems. Because of this feature, Carnap has repeatedly
been accused of failing to make a necessary distinction between object language and
metalanguage, an accusation we will reassess. A third feature characteristic of Car-
nap’s pre-Syntax logic concerns his treatment of logical languages themselves, which
are not conceived of as formal or disinterpreted by him, as is usual today, but as
“meaningful formalisms” that come with a fixed and intended interpretation.
In our reevaluation of Carnap’s early metatheory we aim to avoid simple, anachro-
nistic ex post corrections of the logical “mistakes” contained in Carnap’s work, i.e.,
to point to differences between his and the now standard approach only to dismiss
Carnap’s. Taking Carnap’s original definitions seriously, analyzing them in their his-
torical context, and evaluating them, both on their own terms and in comparison to
later results, is meant to contribute to a substantive, balanced, and genuinely con-
textual history with respect to Carnap’s contributions to logic. More particularly, our
aim is to expand upon the existing literature by providing detailed treatments of Car-
nap’s notions of logical consequence, model, isomorphism, formality, and various
“k-concepts.” But this will have repercussions on other issues as well, including the
notions of completeness and decidability.3
The paper is organized as follows. We begin, in section 2, by introducing the ap-
proach to axiomatic theories and their models as developed by Carnap in the Abriss,
3 Our discussion in this paper builds on existing scholarship. The first phase of engagement with Car-
nap’s “general axiomatics” project consisted in the pioneering but overly critical work by Coffa (1991) and
Hintikka (1991, 1992). Both authors criticize the “monolinguistic approach” adopted by Carnap, i.e., his
attempt to express axiomatic theories and their metatheory in a single type-theoretic language. A second
phase set in with Awodey’s and Carus’ important paper on the logical and philosophical analysis of the
main technical result in Untersuchungen, the so-called Gabelbarkeitssatz (Awodey and Carus 2001). That
paper was followed by a number of articles aimed at a more balanced account of Carnap’s project. In them,
not only the limitations of his approach were acknowledged, but also its innovative aspects and its signif-
icant influence on later developments in metalogic (Awodey and Reck 2002a; Reck 2004; Goldfarb 2005;
Reck 2007). The third phase consists in fairly recent scholarship in which attention is drawn to previously
neglected details of Carnap’s early model theory and in which its role in the development of metalogic is
spelled out more (Reck 2011; Schiemer 2012b,a, 2013; Schiemer and Reck 2013; Loeb 2014a,b).
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which also provides the framework for his metalogical investigations in Untersuchun-
gen. We then introduce the main metatheoretic notions as defined in Untersuchungen,
focusing especially on Carnap’s explication of logical consequence and (various ver-
sions of) completeness.4 In section 3, we discuss in what way Carnap’s approach
to semantics in Untersuchungen differs from the now standard approach. We aim to
show that Carnap’s approach was neither idiosyncratic in its historical context, nor is
it as misguided as was often claimed later. In section 4 we address a specific ques-
tion regarding Carnap’s semantic notions, that of domain variation. This is a crucial
aspect of the current definitions of model and consequence and, contrary to what has
often been assumed, it can be accommodated within Carnap’s type-theoretic frame-
work. Next, in section 5, we reconsider Carnap’s notion of logical consequence in
relation to the proof-theoretic notion of derivability. It is here that Carnap’s approach
is hardest to reconcile with the now standard perspective, and we attempt to diagnose
the resulting difficulties precisely. In section 6, we focus on the notion of higher-level
isomorphism, the closely related notion of “formality”, as part of his definitions of
forkability and completeness, and Carnap’s proof of the Gabelbarkeitssatz. In sec-
tion 7, we further elaborate on the lack a proper distinction between model-theoretic
and proof-theoretic notions in Untersuchungen, here especially the difficulties caused
for Carnap’s discussion of the distinction between “absolute forkability” and “con-
structive decidability”, or between “absolute” and “constructive” concepts more gen-
erally. Finally, Section 8 contains a brief summary of our findings, together with
suggestions for possible future research.
2 Axiomatic theories and Carnap’s model theory
Carnap’s approach to formalizing axiomatic theories is discussed in detail in Abriss
and Untersuchungen. In this section, we give a brief and slightly updated presenta-
tion of this basic approach. According to Carnap, axioms, axiom systems, and cor-
responding theorems are to be expressed in a higher-order language, more precisely
a language of simple (or de-ramified) types.5 A formal axiom system is understood
by him as a “theory schema, the empty form of a possible theory”. Here the primi-
tive terms of a theory are represented by means of variables (of given arity and type)
X1, . . . ,Xn (and not, as is usual today, by means of schematic nonlogical constants).
Axioms, axiom systems, and their theorems are then symbolized as propositional
functions of the form f (X1, . . . ,Xn), i.e. as open formulas in the current sense. Finally,
a corresponding theory is a formula that consists of the conjunction of the relevant
axioms (and not, as is usual today, of the closure of the set of axioms under deductive
or semantic consequence).6
4 The content of this section will be familiar to the Carnap specialist. But it can serve as an introduction
to the reader not yet familiar with Carnap’s general axiomatics program and the literature around it; we
also expand on that literature with respect to some details. Similar remarks apply to the next two sections.
5 A detailed presentation of Carnap’s type-theoretic logic can be found in (Carnap 1929, §9).
6 To be more precise, Carnap describes two different ways of formalizing axiom systems in Abriss.
According to the first approach, primitive terms are expressed in terms of nonlogical constants that already
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We can consider one of Carnap’s own examples to further illustrate this approach. In
the second part of Abriss, axiom systems from arithmetic, geometry, topology, and
physics are formalized in a type-theoretic language. Among them are Hausdorff’s
axioms for topology and the corresponding topological theory. The single “primitive
sign” of this theory is a binary relation variable U(α,x) that stands for “α is a neigh-
borhood of x”. A second set variable pu (standing for the set of points) is then defined
relative to U(α,x), namely as the range of the neighborhood relation. The theory’s
axioms are the following:7
Dom(U)⊂℘(pu) (Ax1a)
U⊂ ∈−1 (Ax1b)
∀α,β ,x (U(α,x)∧U(β ,x)→∃γ(U(γ,x)∧ γ ⊂ (α ∩β ))) (Ax2)
∀α,x (α ∈ Dom(U)∧ x ∈ α →∃γ(U(γ,x)∧ γ ⊂ α)) (Ax3)
∀x,y(x,y ∈ pu∧ x 6= y →∃α,β (U(α,x)∧U(β ,y)∧ (α ∩β ) = /0)) (Ax4)
Notice that each of these axioms is purely logical, i.e. an open formula containing
only logical primitives of the type-theoretic language and logico-mathematical con-
stants (such as ‘Dom(X)’ or ‘x ∈ α’) that are explicitly defined in that language. In
addition, the axioms contain two highlighted “primitive signs,” i.e., free variables that
represent the primitive terms of the theory. Finally, Hausdorff’s theory is expressed
by an open formula ΦHausd that consists of the conjunction of Ax1−Ax4.
In Abriss, Carnap is not yet explicit about how he understands interpretations or mod-
els for such theories. However, in Untersuchungen, as well as in Carnap (1930) and
Carnap and Bachmann (1936)), a detailed discussion of such models is provided.
Roughly, models of a theory are treated as ordered sequences of predicates of the
type-theoretic language that can be substituted for the variables representing the
“primitive terms” of a theory. (Model classes, i.e., the classes of all models corre-
sponding to a given theory, can then be considered correspondingly.) Compare, for
instance, Carnap’s following characterization:
If fR is satisfied by the constant R1, where R1 is an abbreviation for a system
of relations P1, Q1, . . . , then R1 is called a “model” of f . A model is a system
of concepts of the basic discipline, in most cases a system of numbers (number
sets, relations, and such). (Carnap 1930, p. 303)
It is not fully clear from this passage (nor from related ones) whether Carnap under-
stands models as linguistic entities or, instead, as set-theoretic entities, i.e., relational
have a predetermined (and fixed) meaning. According to the second approach (the one typical for formal
axiomatics), the primitive terms defined by a theory have no predetermined meaning; they express, in
Carnap’s terminology, only “improper concepts”. Such terms are symbolized by means of variables in the
way described above. Compare (Carnap 1929, §30b). In what follows, we will always assume this second
approach to the formalization of theories.
7 Put informally, these axioms state that (1a) neighborhoods are classes of points, (1b) a point belongs
to each of its neighborhoods; (2) the intersection of two neighborhoods of a point contains a neighborhood,
(3) for every point of a neighborhood α a subclass of α is also a neighborhood, and (4) for two different
points there are two corresponding neighborhoods that do not intersect; see Carnap (1929, §33a). Carnap’s
own type-theoretic presentation of these axioms has been slightly modernized here, although we have also
preserved some of his idiosyncratic notation.
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structures in the current sense (which could be specified in his type-theoretic back-
ground language by using constants and predicates of the right type). The important
point to note, in any case, is that satisfaction—truth in a model—is treated substi-
tutionally by Carnap: Given a sequence of predicates of the form M = 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉,
where each predicate Ri represents an admissible value of the i-th primitive sign of the
theory f (X1, . . . ,Xn), he maintains that the theory is true in the model M if the sen-
tence resulting from the substitution of each primitive variable by its corresponding
predicate in the model, i.e., f (R1, . . . ,Rn), “is true”, or “holds”, in his underlying type-
theoretic logic. (The central interpretive issue of what such type-theoretic “truth” or
“holding” amounts to for Carnap will be discussed in the next section.)
Returning to the above example, we can say that a particular model of Hausdorff’s
topology is given by a tuple 〈pu,U〉 consisting of a unary and a binary predicate
that—if substituted for the two primitive variables—turn axioms Ax1–Ax4 into true
sentences. If we put aside Carnap’s substitutional approach to truth for the moment,
his account of formal axiomatic theories and their models looks, on the surface, like
the now standard model-theoretic treatment. However, additional and important dif-
ferences become evident if one pays closer attention to how exactly metatheoretic
concepts are defined by Carnap within this type-theoretic framework.
Carnap’s main contribution in Untersuchungen is not the logical formalization of
axiomatic theories presented in the previous section. Carnap’s way of formalizing
theories in terms of propositional functions, and of their primitives in terms of free
variables, was common at the time; similar approaches can be found in work by logi-
cians like Russell, Tarski, and Langford, and mathematicians like Peano, Hilbert, and
Huntington. Rather, it consists of his explications of several metatheoretic notions
that had been used informally in mathematics since Dedekind and Hilbert.8 A closer
look at these explications reveals several striking differences to the now standard
approach. Most importantly, in contrast to current model theory and proof theory,
Carnap provided metatheoretic definitions for the theories he was considering partly
in the same language in which they were formulated, and partly in an informal met-
alanguage (German). He did not clearly distinguish between an object language (in
which theories are expressed) and a metalanguage (in which model-theoretical and
proof-theoretical results for such theories are stated). To a certain degree, it is justi-
fied to say that Carnap’s project is “monolinguistic” in character: it assumes a single
higher-order language, more specifically a language of simple type theory (hence-
forth LTT ), in which both axiomatic theories and their metatheoretical properties are
expressed.9
8 See Awodey and Carus (2001), Reck (2004), and Carus (2007) for the broader philosophical context
of Carnap’s metatheoretical work in Untersuchungen, including its connections to the Aufbau (1928). Car-
nap’s own views on the broader philosophical significance of his general axiomatics project are elaborated,
in particular, in “Eigentliche und uneigentliche Begriffe” (Carnap 1927). Further exploring this part of the
background deserves a separate investigation, one that may help to account more for some of the idiosyn-
cracies in Carnap’s metalogical approach even beyond 1930. However, we cannot take on this additional
task in the present paper.
9 It should be emphasized, however, that the early critical discussion of this monolinguistic character
by Coffa and Hintikka does not do justice to the subtleties of Carnap’s approach. As was first analyzed
in detail in Awodey and Carus (2001), Carnap presupposes a “basic system” (Grunddisziplin), that is, a
Carnap’s Early Metatheory: Scope and Limits 7
Let us now consider some particular metatheoretic notions discussed in Untersuchun-
gen so as to illustrate Carnap’s approach further. The notion of “consequence” is
introduced as follows by him:
Definition 1 (Consequence) A sentence g is a consequence of axiom system f iff
∀R( fR→ gR)
Consequence is here specified in terms of the material conditional, or more precisely,
via a quantified conditional statement of LT T .10 This differs obviously from the now
standard model-theoretic approach to the notion; but there are also structural similar-
ities. Notice, in particular, that Carnap’s definition involves universal quantification
over what he takes to be models of a theory. In addition, in (Carnap 1928/2000) he
states explicitly that his notion of consequence is not to be conflated with Hilbert’s
notion of derivability in a formal system.11
Based on this definition of consequence, together with related type-theoretic defini-
tions of further auxiliary notions (such as those of isomorphism between models and
satisfiability of a theory, more on which below), Carnap specifies three notions of
completeness for a theory, namely “monomorphicity”, “(non-)forkability”, and “de-
cidability”.12 The three notions were identified earlier by Fraenkel (1928). Carnap
is here responding to an open research question posed by Fraenkel, viz., what the
relationship between them is. His specification of monomorphicity is the following:
Definition 2 (Monomorphic) An axiom system f is monomorphic iff
∃R( fR)∧∀P∀Q[( fP∧ fQ)→ Ismq(P,Q)]
theory of “contentful” logical and mathematical concepts, that forms the background for the logical study
of axiomatic theories. In Carnap (1928/2000), simple type theory is proposed as one possible choice for
such an interpreted basic system. As we will show below, Carnap employed it similarly to the way in
which we use axiomatic set theory as the background for the metatheoretic study of axiomatic theories
today. Thus, while a clear-cut object/metalanguage is still missing in Untersuchungen, Carnap’s approach
can be characterized as metatheoretic. Compare Schiemer and Reck (2013) for a further discussion of this
point. In addition, it should be stressed that Carnap’s convention to formulate both axiom systems and
their metatheoretic properties within a single and interpreted Grunddisziplin was not uncommon at the
time. See, for instance, a related discussion of a necessary “absolute foundation” of axiomatic theories in
Fraenkel’s third edition of Introduction to Set Theory (Awodey and Carus 2001, p.154). Finally, a similar
idea is present in own Carnap’s subsequent work, in particular in his Logical Syntax: it is shown here that
the “syntax language” for language LI can be formulated within LI itself. See (Carnap 1934, §18).
10 In Carnap’s own words: “g is called a ‘consequence’ of f , if f generally implies g: ∀R( fR→ gR),
abbreviated: f → g. The consequence is, as is the AS, not a sentence, but a propositional function; only
the associated implication f → g is a sentence, namely a purely logical sentence, thus a tautology, since
no nonlogical constants occur.” (Carnap 1930, p. 304)
11 In Untersuchungen Carnap argues that “g follows from f ” and “g is derivable from f in TT”, while
not identical, are equivalent. See (Carnap 1928/2000, p. 92); ASP RC 080–34–03, p. 41a–b. We will come
back to this issue later.
12 As discussed by Awodey and Carus (2001) and Awodey and Reck (2002a), these correspond roughly
to what would today be called categoricity, semantic completeness, and syntactic completeness. Then
again, this correspondence must be viewed with caution, especially in the case of the latter two notions, as
we will shown in section 7.
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Here the first conjunct states, along Carnapian lines, that the theory f is satisfied,
while the second conjunct asserts that all of its models are isomorphic.
A second version of completeness of an axiom system is that of “non-forkability”
(“Nicht-Gabelbarkeit”). With respect to it, the crucial Carnapian definition is the fol-
lowing:
Definition 3 (Forkability) An axiom system f is forkable at a sentence g iff
∃R( fR∧gR)∧∃S( fS∧¬gS)∧∀P∀Q[(gP∧ Ismq(P,Q))→ gQ]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
For(g)
The first two conjuncts in this formula state that theory f is satisfiable jointly with
sentence (or propositional function) g as well as with its negation ¬g. The third con-
junct expresses the fact that g is “formal”: if g is true in a particular model, then it
is also true in any other model isomorphic to the former. (We will come back to this
notion of formality below.) A theory is then “non-forkable” if it is not forkable in this
sense. In other words, it is non-forkable if there is no formal sentence g such that both
f ∧g and f ∧¬g are satisfiable.
Carnap’s definition of “decidability” (“Entscheidungsdefinitheit”) is this:
Definition 4 (Decidability) An axiom system f is decidable iff
∃R( fR)∧∀g(For(g)→∀P(( fP→ gP)∨ ( fP→¬gP)))
This definition states that a theory is decidable if it satisfiable and if for any for-
mal sentence g (again expressed by a propositional function like above) either it or
its negation is a consequence of the theory. Note that, given Carnap’s definition of
consequence, this makes it another version of the later notion of semantic complete-
ness, rather than of that of decidability in the sense of computability theory. (For a
closely related discussion of Carnap’s “constructive” variant of this notion, i.e. “k-
decidability”, see section 7.)
Monomorphicity, (non-)forkability, and decidability are the three central notions dis-
cussed in the first part of Untersuchungen (Carnap 1928/2000). Even from today’s
vantage point, these notions are genuinely metatheoretic: Each of them captures a
different logical property of axiomatic theories in terms of their consequences and
their models.13 Beyond them, there exists a fourth, less well-known notion of com-
pleteness that is discussed by Carnap in (the unpublished fragments of) the projected
second part of his manuscript (as well as in his subsequent papers Carnap 1930 and
Carnap and Bachmann 1936).14 That notion is called the “completeness of the mod-
els” of a given axiom system by Carnap. It is closely related to his discussion of
13 The central metatheorem in (Carnap 1928/2000), Carnap’s so-called Gabelbarkeitssatz, concerns then
the relationship between these notions. We will turn to it in section 6.
14 What exists of part two of Untersuchungen is documented in Carnap’s Nachlass (RC 081–01–01 to
081–01–33). See Schiemer (2012b, 2013) for a detailed discussion of its contents.
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“extremal axioms”, i.e., axioms (such as Peano’s induction axiom in arithmetic and
Hilbert’s axiom of completeness in geometry) that impose a minimality or maximal-
ity constraint on the models of a theory.
Extremal axioms are characterized in the following way by Carnap:
Definition 5 (Extremal axioms) Let P be a model of axiom system f . Then
Max( f ,P) =d f ¬∃Q(P ⊂Q∧P 6=Q∧ f (Q))
Min( f ,P) =d f ¬∃Q(Q⊂P∧P 6=Q∧ f (Q))
Here the first sentence states that P is a maximal model of theory f : there are no
elements in the model class of f that are proper extensions of P. Dually, the second
sentence expresses that P is a minimal model of f : there are no elements in the model
class of f that are proper submodels of P. The “metatheoretic” character of Carnap’s
extremal axioms is again clear enough: They do not speak about specific models of
an axiom system, but express properties of its whole model class.15
The type of completeness for axiomatic theories effected by a maximality constraint—
let us call it “Hilbert completeness”—can then be specified by Carnap as follows:
Definition 6 (Hilbert completeness) An axiom system f is Hilbert complete iff
∀P∀Q[( fP & fQ∧P⊆Q)→P=Q]
Put informally, this says that the models of theory f are all maximal, i.e., non-
extendable to other models of f .16
3 Metatheoretic notions in Untersuchungen
Before turning to a more detailed assessment of Carnap’s early metatheory, several
general observations concerning his definitions of these notions are worth making. As
already pointed out above, the main difference to a current model-theoretic treatment
of them concerns his type-theoretic framework: Carnap’s definitions are not formu-
lated in a separate metalanguage, but in a single higher-order language. An important
15 See Schiemer (2013) for a further discussion of Carnap’s extremal axioms, also Loeb (2014a) for an
analysis of Carnap’s notion of submodel underlying his work on extremal axioms.
16 In Carnap’s own words: “The models of an axiom system that is closed by a maximal axiom possess a
certain completeness property in that they cannot be extended without violating the original axiom system.”
(Carnap and Bachmann 1936, p. 82). Carnap’s main goal in part two of Untersuchungen is to give an
explication of different types of extremal axioms and of corresponding notions of completeness. As pointed
out in Schiemer (2013), the notes for it also contain results about the relationship between extremal axioms
and the monomorphicity, or categoricity, of a theory.
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part of this is that the “metatheoretic” generalization over models in them is expressed
in terms of higher-order quantifiers in LT T .17
To illustrate this aspect further, consider the current model-theoretic treatment of log-
ical consequence. Let ϕ be a sentence of a given language L and let Γ be a theory,
i.e., a set of L -sentences. To say that ϕ is a consequence of Γ is nowadays expressed
as Γ |= ϕ or, more explicitly, ∀M(M |= Γ ⇒ M |= ϕ). This statement is usually
not expressed in L itself, but in a separate metalanguage, e.g. the language of set
theory, in which expressions of the object language can be coded and suitable defini-
tions of “satisfaction” or “truth in a model” given. Such an approach presupposes a
strong background theory, e.g. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC), in which models
of the theory Γ can actually be constructed. By contrast, Carnap formulates logical
consequence by means of a quantified conditional statement ∀X(Γ (X)→ ϕ(X)) in
a type-theoretic language LT T , as we saw. This statement does not contain model
quantifiers in the now usual sense, i.e., quantifiers that range over the set-theoretic
models of the theory in question. Instead Carnap uses higher-order quantifiers in LTT
that range over different possible interpretations of the primitive terms of the theory
in question, in his sense of interpretation.
For all its differences, there is a striking structural similarity between Carnap’s ap-
proach and the now usual model-theoretic approach, at least in the case where Γ is
finite.18 To see this better, one has to look closely at how metatheoretic claims are
formalized more fully today. It is a simple model-theoretic fact that the statement “ϕ
follows from Γ ” (i.e. Γ |= ϕ) is equivalent to “Γ ∗ → ϕ is valid” (i.e. |= Γ ∗ → ϕ),
where Γ ∗ is the conjunction of the sentences in Γ . The standard way to make the
latter claim fully precise is to translate it into a set-theoretic statement that turns out
to be provable in axiomatic set theory, say in ZFC. Thus, we can say that ϕ follows
from Γ iff ∀M(Sat(pΓ ∗ → ϕq,M) is a theorem of ZFC, i.e., iff
ZFC ⊢ ∀M(Sat(pΓ ∗ → ϕq,M).
Here the expression pΓ ∗→ϕq is a coded version of the corresponding object-language
statement, M is a set-variable that ranges over L -structures, and Sat(x,y) is a stan-
dard satisfaction (or truth) predicate that relates L -formulas to L -structures.
Carnap’s account of consequence reveals itself to be very similar to this set-theoretical
formalization if one makes more explicit some assumptions concerning the Grund-
disziplin underlying his study of general axiomatics. Specifically, we saw in section 2
that a central semantic notion taken as primitive (or left implicit) in Carnap’s account
is the notion of “being true” or “holding” in simple type theory (henceforth: TT). The
truth of a theory in a particular model is then specified in terms of this notion: a theory
(expressed by a propositional function) f (X1, . . . ,Xn) is “satisfied” by a sequence of
17 The question of how this squares with the technique of model variation is discussed in section 4.
18 Note here that for practical purposes the restriction to finite theories is largely irrelevant to the logi-
cians of the 1920s. Theories we now think of as requiring infinite axiomatizations, such as Peano Arith-
metic and ZFC, would have been given finite axiomatizations then. The induction schema, for instance,
would be formalized in terms of a single sentence with a higher-order quantifier. In Hilbert’s axiomatics
too, the schema would be formalized as a single axiom with a formula variable.
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predicates 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 if the sentence f (R1, . . . ,Rn) “holds” in TT. Now, what does
Carnap mean by saying that a sentence of his background language “holds”?
Two reconstructions would seem to be consistent with his remarks on this topic in
Untersuchungen. The first is to treat “holds in TT” semantically, as truth in the in-
tended (and fixed) interpretation of the type-theoretical language, i.e., as truth in the
universe of types. (We will return to this interpretation in the next section.) The sec-
ond reconstruction is to treat the notion in terms of provability in the type-theoretic
system described by Carnap. Thus, to say that fR holds in the basic system can be
understood as saying that fR is derivable in TT.19
Along the same lines, we can make more precise Carnap’s notion of consequence: the
metatheoretic claim that g is a consequence of a theory f can be represented formally
as follows:
TT ⊢ ∀R( fR→ gR)
Thus, to say that g is a consequence of f is simply to say that the quantified con-
ditional statement is a theorem of TT. This type-theoretic reconstruction of the con-
sequence relation is evidently quite similar to its now usual set-theoretic treatment.
Notice, in particular, that (first-order) ZFC and Carnap’s simple type theory TT play
similar foundational roles: Both are strong background theories that allow one to
construct models of given mathematical theories. Moreover, the respective languages
allow one to generalize over these models in term of (first-order or higher-order)
quantifiers. Viewed from this perspective, the main difference between Carnap’s ap-
proach and the later model-theoretic approach is not a missing meta-language/object-
language distinction. Rather, the main difference lies in the fact that the basic seman-
tic notion of “satisfaction in a model” (corresponding to Sat(x,y) above) is taken
as primitive, rather than recursively defined. A recursive definition, as model theory
uses it today, would require a suitable method of coding expressions in the meta-
language, and this was unavailable to Carnap in 1928. Go¨del and Tarski developed
precise treatments of these notions in the following years, of course, which Carnap
could then make use of in his later work, as he in fact did.
4 Models and domain variation
How does Carnap’s type-theoretic explication of model-theoretic notions square with
the now usual model-theoretic approach in other respects? In particular, an impor-
tant interpretive issue discussed in the secondary literature concerns how the notion
of domain variation is captured, and if it can be captured at all within his frame-
work.
Domain or model variability is a core idea in standard model theory. Again, a theory
is expressed in a formal or disinterpreted language that usually contains a set of non-
19 It is not specified in Untersuchungen which basic laws and inference rules are included in TT. But
Carnap holds at one point that “the basic discipline has to contain theorems (Lehrsa¨tze) about logical,
set-theoretical, and arithmetical concepts” (Carnap 1928/2000, p. 61), RC 080–34–03, p. 6.
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logical constants, the theory’s primitives. The semantic interpretation of this language
is then specified relative to a model in the usual way: The constants are treated in
terms of an interpretation function that assigns individuals from the model’s domain
to individual constants, n-ary relations (on the domain) to n-ary predicates, and n-ary
functions (on the domain) to n-ary function symbols. Quantified variables, finally, are
interpreted as ranging over the domain of the model. A guiding idea underlying this
approach is that this semantic treatment of a language (and, consequently, of a theory
expressed in it) can be varied, i.e., it can be specified relative to models with different
domains and corresponding interpretation functions.
Carnap’s conception of logic in the late 1920s differs clearly from such a model-
theoretic account. We already saw that theories are expressed by him in a type-
theoretic language LT T that is not formal in the sense just mentioned but “contentual”
(“inhaltlich”).20 In other words, he uses a fully interpreted language, one whose con-
stants have a fixed interpretation and whose variables range over a fixed universe of
objects.21 Carnap is not explicit about the precise nature of the semantics underlying
LTT in Untersuchungen or related writings, but—at least in 1928—it is most likely
meant to involve a rich ontology, namely a full “universe of types” V. In light of his
specification of the theory of relations and of type theory in (Carnap 1928/2000) as
well as (Carnap 1929), this universe of types can be reconstructed in current termi-
nology as a model of the form V = 〈{Dτ}τ , I〉, where {Dτ}τ is a “frame,” i.e. a set of
type domains, and I an interpretation function for the constants in LT T .22
With this in mind, we can go back to the “semantic” reconstruction of Carnap’s
metatheoretical approach that was mentioned as an option in section 3. Consider
again his definition of the notion of consequence. The correctness of the statement “g
follows from theory f ” can now also be represented in terms of the notion of truth in
the universe of types, or more formally, as:
V |= ∀R( f (R)→ g(R))
According to this second reconstruction of Carnap’s account, a metatheoretic claim
is correct (or holds in the Grunddisziplin) if the type-theoretic sentence expressing it
is true in the underlying universe of types.23
20 As Carnap writes: “Every treatment and examination of an axiom system thus presupposes a logic,
specifically a contentual logic, i.e., a system of sentences which are not mere arrangements of symbols
but which have a specific meaning. [Jede Behandlung und Pru¨fung eines Axiomensystems setzt also eine
Logik voraus, und zwar eine inhaltliche Logik, d.h. ein System von Sa¨tzen, die nicht bloße Zeichen-
zusammenstellungen sind, sondern eine bestimmte Bedeutung haben.]” (Carnap 1928/2000, p. 60); RC
080–34–03, p. 4. As noted by others, Untersuchungen does not contain an explanation of how the Grund-
disziplin acquires its specific interpretation. Such an explanation is given, at least in outline, in Carnap’s
sketch Neue Grundlegung der Logik written in 1929. See Awodey and Carus (2007) for further details.
21 Carnap remains neutral in Untersuchungen with respect to the specific choice of the signature of his
background language. He holds that arithmetical and set-theoretical terms can either be understood as
“logical” primitives or introduced by explicit definition in the (pure) type-theoretic language in a logicist
fashion. See (Carnap 1928/2000, pp. 60–63); RC 080–34–03, pp. 4–8.
22 See Schiemer and Reck (2013) for further details, as well as Andrews (2002) for a general discussion
of the semantics of type theoretic languages.
23 It is important to emphasize that this reconstruction is most likely not how Carnap understood the
phrase “statement ϕ holds in the basic system” in 1928. As mentioned already, the current semantic
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Against that background, the question arises of whether or not, and if so how, model
domains can be varied for a given theory f . To see the problem more clearly, recall
that both f and the statement ∀R( f (R)→ g(R)) are formulas of the language LTT .
Let us now replace f in the sentence above by the propositional function express-
ing a particular mathematical theory, for instance the complex formula ΦHausd for
Hausdorff’s topological theory. The resulting metatheoretic statement will then con-
tain two types of quantifiers that would be expressed in separate languages today: a
‘metatheoretic’ quantifier ‘∀R’, ranging over the models of Hausdorff’s theory, and
‘object-theoretic’ quantifiers, used in the formulation of the axioms of ΦHausd . (The
latter are the individual and set quantifiers in Axioms 1–4 from section 2.)
For Carnap, both quantifiers are part of the vocabulary of LTT . It follows that both
come with a fixed range. In the case of the metatheoretic quantifiers this is intended:
Intuitively, we want such quantifiers to range over all models of a given theory. Car-
nap’s account corresponds to today’s model-theoretic approach in this respect, where
model quantifiers are usually expressed in an informal but interpreted language of
set theory. The situation is different for the object-theoretic quantifiers: As men-
tioned before, we usually want these quantifiers—which are expressed in a formal
object language—to be freely re-interpretable relative to different interpretations of
that language. Looking at Carnap’s approach, it is not obvious in which way such
model-theoretic re-interpretability of the “object-theoretic” quantifiers contained in
ΦHausd can be effected. Put differently, how can the model-theoretic idea of domain
variation (as assumed in concepts such as consequence and categoricity) be simulated
in Carnap’s type-theoretic framework, if this can be done at all?24
One way to simulate this kind of domain variation that was frequently employed by
Carnap at the time consists in the method of quantifier relativization. The idea is to
effectively restrict the range of an object-theoretic quantifier used in the formulation
of a theory to the interpretation of the primitive terms of the theory. Thus, while
object-language quantifiers have a fixed interpretation in Carnap’s account in general,
their range can be relativized to a particular “model domain” of a theory as soon as
that theory is “interpreted” in a model in Carnap’s sense. In fact, one can distinguish
between two ways of relativizing quantifiers to model domains of theories along such
lines: (i) the direct relativization via specific “variabilized” domain predicates (which
itself comes in two sub-variants) and (ii) the indirect relativization via other primitive
terms of a theory. It is instructive to look at some concrete examples from Carnap’s
writings so as to understand better how these methods are used by him.
notion of satisfaction was not part of his conceptual toolbox at the time. However, and as shown by
Awodey and Carus (2007), this situation changed in the early 1930s, specifically after Carnap’s exchange
with Go¨del on the notion of analyticity. In particular, Carnap’s understanding of “metatheoretic” statements
at that point becomes similar to the semantic reconstruction given here, as argued in Schiemer (2013).
24 This interpretive issue has been much debated in the secondary literature on Carnap’s early semantics.
A central objection against his general axiomatics project, raised early on by Hintikka, was that, due to
Carnap’s semantic universalism or “one domain assumption”, the idea of domain variation was simply
inconceivable (Hintikka 1991). This view has recently been corrected in work by Schiemer, Reck, and
Loeb. In that work, it is shown that Carnap was well aware of the importance of capturing the notion of
domain variability for his metatheoretic work and was not without resources to do so. See Loeb (2014a,b),
Schiemer (2012b, 2013), and Schiemer and Reck (2013).
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In some cases, Carnap restricts the quantifiers used in the formulation of an axiomatic
theory in terms of a specific unary “domain predicate” that is introduced with the
primitive terms of that theory (either as itself a primitive or as a defined predicate).25
A typical example is the formalization of Peano arithmetic in Abriss. The “original”
axiomatization presented there is based on three primitive terms, namely nu, za, Nf
(standing for “Zero”, “x is a number” and “the successor of x”, respectively). By
looking at Carnap’s formulation of the corresponding axioms, it becomes clear that
in this case the predicate x ∈ za functions as a domain predicate in the way described
above:
nu ∈ za (PA1)
∀x(x ∈ za→ Nf(x) ∈ za) (PA2)
∀x∀y((x,y ∈ za∧Nf(x) = Nf(y))→ x = y) (PA3)
∀x(x ∈ za→ Nf(x) 6= nu) (PA4)
∀α((nu ∈ α ∧∀x(x ∈ α → Nf(x) ∈ α))→ za ∈ α) (PA5)
In other examples from Carnap’s work on axiomatics such domain predicates are
not part of the theory’s signature, but are introduced by means of explicit definitions
from the primitive vocabulary.26 Consider again Carnap’s formulation of Hausdorff’s
topological axioms introduced in Section 2: Here a set variable pu (standing for “x
is a point”) is introduced by definition, based on the primitive term U(x,y) (standing
for ‘x is a neighborhood of y’). The individual quantifiers needed in the formulation
of the axioms are then, in the relevant cases, relativized to pu. Take axiom (Ax4) as
an illustration:
∀x,y(x,y ∈ pu∧ x 6= y→∃α,β (U(α,x)∧U(β ,y)∧α ∩β = /0)) (H4)
Finally, there are several examples of axiom systems in Carnap’s work where unary
domain predicates (or set predicates) are not employed at all. Instead, the quantifiers
used in the formulation of a theory are relativized to model domains more indirectly
and implicitly, in terms of other primitive terms of a theory. A typical example is a
second axiomatization of “basic arithmetic” (BA) discussed in Untersuchungen (also,
later, in Carnap and Bachmann 1936). Here the axioms of BA involve a single binary
predicate R(x,y) (for “x is the successor of y”), as follows:27
∀x∀y(R(x,y)→∃z(R(y,z))) (BA1)
∀x∀y∀z((R(x,y)∧R(x,z)→ y = z)∧ (R(x,y)∧R(z,y)→ x = z)) (BA2)
∃!x(x ∈Dom(R)∧ x /∈ Ran(R)) (BA3)
Notice that in this case the object-theoretic quantifiers are effectively restricted to the
field of any binary relation assigned to the primitive sign R(x,y), and thus, to any
given model domain of the theory BA.
25 As pointed out by Schiemer (2013), a very similar convention of type relativization can also be found
in Tarski’s work on the “methodology of the deductive sciences,” from the same period. Compare Mancosu
(2010b) for a detailed discussion of Tarski’s case and the other secondary literature on the topic.
26 This approach of specifying domain predicates was first discussed by Loeb (2014a).
27 Carnap and Bachmann add a fourth meta-axiom to BA1–3 that restricts the possible interpretations of
BA1–3 to minimal models, in the sense specified in Section 3. See (Carnap and Bachmann 1936, p. 179).
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Given these examples, two additional remarks about Carnap’s approach are in order.
First, one main difference between his approach and current model theory is that in-
stead of providing an interpretation function for un-interpreted non-logical symbols,
Carnap’s approach simply quantifies over these non-logical symbols. The primitive
terms of a theory are expressed by free variables; and the semantic specification of
the latter, relative to a particular model, is given in terms of the substitution of these
variables by interpreted constants of the basic discipline. It might seem as if this way
of doing things leaves no room for another crucial ingredient of model theory, namely
the domain of quantification of a model. But as we have seen, this is accommodated
in Carnap’s account: domains are understood either as the extensions of a specific
(primitive or defined) domain predicate or, in cases where such a predicate is absent,
as the (first-order) fields of the relations assigned to the primitive signs of a given
theory.28
Second, it should be clear by now that the various ways of quantifier relativization
used by Carnap allow him to simulate the domain variability typically assumed in
model-theoretic notions (such as consequence and categoricity) despite the fact that
his theories are expressed in a single fully interpreted language. Instead of reinter-
preting a formal object language (including the range of the object-language quan-
tifiers) in a separate metatheory, domain variation is effected by the relativization
of the quantifiers of his single language to the primitive terms of a theory. Carnap’s
systematic use of this technique shows (contra Coffa, Hintikka, and others) that his
explications of various notions were genuinely model-theoretic in spirit. His pro-
posal contained an early form of model theory that included the notion of domain
variation.
5 Consequence and derivability
In modern metalogic, we use two important and related distinctions. The first, already
discussed above, is that between the object language, for which we give definitions
of, say, logical consequence and derivability, and the metalanguage, in which we
formulate these definitions and prove corresponding results. The second distinction,
28 See Schiemer (2013) for a more detailed discussion of Carnap’s “domain as fields” conception of
models. Compare Loeb (2014a) for an alternative account of Carnap’s understanding of models. Loeb’s
discussion focuses on examples of axiomatic theories where a domain predicate is introduced into the lan-
guage in terms of an explicit definition from the theory’s primitive signs. These defined domain predicates
provide further confirmation for the interpretation of Carnap’s conception of model given in Schiemer
(2013), given that in most cases a model domain is explicitly specified as the domain or range or field of
a given primitive relation. Nevertheless, Loeb holds that “the domains-as-fields conception is too strict to
describe Carnap’s practice.” (Loeb 2014a, p. 427) The particular example she has in mind is an axiomati-
zation of projective geometry with one unary primitive predicate ger (for the class of ‘lines’). The domain
of a model of the theory (i.e. the class of ‘points’) is not defined as the field of the relations assigned to
ger, but as the union of the elements of all lines (Carnap 1929, §34). We would like to stress that this and
similar examples are fully in accord with the interpretation of model domains given in Schiemer (2013).
For a more detailed analysis of model domains of lower types see, in particular, the discussion of Carnap’s
notes on “domain analysis” from part two of Untersuchungen in (Schiemer 2013, pp. 506-508).
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to be discussed further now, is that between semantic notions, such as truth, con-
sequence, and satisfiability, and proof-theoretic notions, such as proof, derivability,
and consistency. One of the main tasks of metalogic is to relate these different no-
tions, e.g., when proving soundness and completeness. Even before Tarski made the
object/metalanguage distinction a topic of explicit study, logicians respected that dis-
tinction implicitly (at least to a large extent). For example, Carnap’s Untersuchungen
is written in German (the meta-language), in which definitions for his type-theoretic
language (the object-language) are formulated and corresponding results proved. As
will be clarified further in the next section, Carnap was also aware of the distinguish-
ing between truth and proof. Yet both distinctions were neither as sharply drawn nor
their importance as fully recognized by him as one would expect today.
As just noted, Carnap formulated his relevant definitions in a metalanguage. But in-
stead of defining notions such as consequence and satisfiability by means of metalin-
guistic notions, he defined them by using sentences of his Grunddisziplin, thereby
taking for granted that its sentences express determinate propositions. For instance,
recall the definition of satisfiability of an axiom system f , which we encountered in
passing above: “ f is satisfiable iff ∃R fR.” From today’s viewpoint, this definition
fails to distinguish between expressions of an object language and expressions that
now belong to a separate metalanguage, such as the quantifier “∃R” and predication
of the relation “satisfies” to R and f . In addition, Carnap talks about “values” of the
variables R—his models, which can be exhibited and investigated in the metalan-
guage. It is in the latter connection that his approach led to several further confusions
and false starts, as a closer look at Untersuchungen will reveal.
One problem Carnap did not appreciate in this context is that describing a model
of f in his metalanguage and proving ∃R fR in type theory are by no means the
same thing. That is to say, a metatheoretic description of a model of f does not, by
itself, result in terms in type theory that can be substituted for R in fR so that fR,
and with it ∃R fR, can be proved from the axioms of type theory. Conversely, type
theory may prove ∃R fR without a description of the model being available in the
metalanguage. Having said that, Carnap’s definition of satisfiability is acceptable if
two additional assumptions can be made: that all relevant mathematical constructions
which can be carried out in the metalanguage can also be formalized in type theory;
and that what type theory proves is true. It is not implausible to suppose that Carnap
took these assumptions for granted. The first assumption received ample evidence
from the success of Russell and Whitehead’s work in formalizing mathematics, the
second from the belief that the axioms of type theory express logical truths (at least
those of the simple theory of types).
A second problematic aspect, already mentioned briefly above, is that the satisfaction
relation is not explicitly defined by Carnap. Indeed, instead of taking it to be a relation
in the metalanguage between the axiom system f , seen as a syntactic object, and the
model R1, seen as a semantic object, and then using a recursive definition along
Tarskian lines, he simply assumes that “R1 satisfies f ” is meaningful. In section 2.3
of Untersuchungen,29 Carnap defines an “admissible model” of fR as a system of
29 Carnap (1928/2000), p. 95; RC 080–34–02, §13, p. 42.
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relations R1 consisting of “allowed values” of the variables in R, i.e., a system of
relations of the same type as the types of the variables in R. If it is, he writes, then
the propositional function fR applied to R1 does or doesn’t “hold”. This is imprecise
by today’s standards, although it can be interpreted in a way that it is correct, as we
saw. If R1 is an admissible model of fR, Carnap also sometimes writes that fR1 is
“true” or “false”. This is worse, since “R1” is not an expression of type theory, and
hence, neither is fR1.
To some degree we may forgive Carnap this lapse, since everyone at the time spoke
this imprecisely. For instance, logicians in the Hilbert school also considered basic
semantic notions, such as satisfaction and truth, and spoke freely of formulas of first
order logic being “satisfied” in certain domains, or of a formula being “true” for a par-
ticular value of its free variables, as if sets and relations could all automatically serve
as names for themselves in the object language. Moreover, when satisfaction in a par-
ticular model is not at issue but only general claims about satisfaction and models,
this problem does not arise: all the model variables are then bound by type-theoretic
quantifiers and the statements in question are sentences of type theory. In that sense
(and assuming that the sentences of type theory are meaningful and express logical
propositions), Carnap was justified in regarding his results to be theorems.
A third crucial difficulty in Carnap’s definitions of metalogical concepts concerns his
quantification over propositional functions. For instance, Carnap’s definition of “ f is
inconsistent” is given by the following type-theoretic sentence:
∃h∀R( fR→ (hR∧¬hR))
When defining “ f is satisfiable” in terms of ∃R fR, this at least expresses what is
intended (the existence of a satisfying sequence of relations of the right types). By
contrast, the definition here does not. For h is a variable ranging over higher-type ob-
jects, it seems, and not, as would be needed, a variable ranging over syntactic expres-
sions. Again, Carnap is not alone in being unclear about this aspect at the time. Just
as in Principia Mathematica, his h is a variable ranging over propositional functions;
and Russell and Whitehead were notoriously vague about whether quantification over
propositional functions was supposed to be thought of substitutionally or objectually.
But there are more profound problems with Carnap’s approach to consistency.
Today we use the terms “consistent” and “inconsistent” as proof-theoretic notions:
an axiom system is inconsistent if there is a sentence ϕ such that ϕ ∧¬ϕ can be
proved from it. Carnap’s definition, by contrast, uses his own notion of consequence:
an axiom system is inconsistent if there is a sentence ϕ such that ϕ ∧¬ϕ is a conse-
quence of it. Now, this was an idiosyncratic definition even when Carnap was writing.
We know that Hilbert, who put great emphasis on the consistency of axiom systems
(and proofs thereof), already defined it proof-theoretically at that time.30 Carnap was
certainly aware of Hilbert’s work and, one would assume, intended to provide a def-
30 However, the usage of logical terminology was by no means settled then. For example, Skolem (1920)
used the term “inconsistent [widerspruchsvoll]” to mean unsatisfiable; even Hilbert himself at times uses
“A is a consequence of [folgt aus] B” to mean “A → B holds.”
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inition that matched Hilbert’s. The fact that he thought his definition managed to do
that seems to be the result of several further confusions.
To begin with, Carnap thought that provability in Hilbert’s sense and consequence as
defined by him coincide. In fact, he presented an argument for this: Section 2.2 of Un-
tersuchungen contains an explicit comparison of his approach with Hilbert’s.31 Car-
nap establishes there that, if gx can be proved from the axiom system f x in Hilbert’s
sense, then ∀x( f x → gx) can be proved, and conversely. He concluded that the con-
cept of consequence defined by “is provable from” and his own notion of consequence
coincide. But this inference is unwarranted, for two reasons. One is technical: Car-
nap’s notion of consequence relies on a much stronger system than Hilbert’s, and,
e.g., the provability of ∀R( fR→ gR) in type theory does not obviously guarantee
the provability of the formula fR→ gR in Hilbert’s system.32 The other reason is
more fundamental: Carnap’s argument establishes that gR is provable from fR in
Hilbert’s system iff ∀R( fR→ gR) is provable in type theory. But that is not enough
to establish that Carnap’s consequence coincides with Hilbert’s provability. For that,
we would need to show that gR is provable from fR iff ∀R( fR→ gR) is true in
type theory.
In section 2.4 of Untersuchungen, Carnap considers the relationship between consis-
tency and satisfaction. In particular, he argues that every inconsistent axiom system
is unsatisfiable (Theorem 2.4.1), and conversely, that every consistent axiom system
is satisfiable (Theorem 2.4.8).33 The definitions at work here are Carnap’s, of course,
not the ones used today. Thus, Theorem 2.4.1 establishes, in type theory, that
∃h∀R( fR→ (hR∧¬hR))→¬∃R fR, (1)
and Theorem 2.4.2 the reverse direction, in the form of its contrapositive,
¬∃h∀R( fR→ (hR∧¬hR))→∃R fR. (2)
Carnap’s proofs consist of several elementary logical steps. For instance, to estab-
lish (2), he argues as follows: Assume the antecedent, ¬∃h∀R( fR→ (hR∧¬hR)).
Pushing the initial negation across the quantifiers and using ¬(ϕ → ψ)→ (ϕ ∧¬ψ),
we obtain ∀h∃R( fR∧¬(hR∧¬hR)). As f only appears in the left conjunct and h
only in the right, we can shift quantifiers and obtain ∃R fR∧∀h¬(hR∧¬hR). The
left conjunct is the desired conclusion. So indeed Carnap’s proofs are correct—but
the results do not mean what we mean by “consistency implies satisfiability”.
Carnap’s argument for the equivalence of Hilbert’s notion of provability and his own
notion of consequence does yield the following: If an axiom system is inconsistent,
i.e., can prove ϕ ∧¬ϕ for some formula ϕ , then type theory proves the antecedent
31 Carnap (1928/2000), p. 90ff; RC 080–34–03, §12, p. 39ff.
32 If the variables in R are at most second order, then the result holds. In that case, assuming soundness
of type theory, fR→ gR is valid in first-order logic. Thus its provability in Hilbert’s system follows from
Go¨del’s completeness theorem, also from a proof-theoretic conservativity proof, neither of which were
available to Carnap yet.
33 §2.4 of (Carnap 1928/2000, p. 96ff) is §14 in RC 080–34–03, p. 46ff; Theorem 2.4.1 is Satz 1 on
p. 47; Theorem 2.4.8 is Satz 8 on p. 49.
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of Theorem 2.4.1, “∃h∀R( fR→ (hR∧¬hR)),” and hence also the consequent. But
the negation of “ f is (Hilbert) inconsistent” is only: for no formula ϕ does f prove
ϕ ∧¬ϕ . It does not follow that type theory proves ¬∃h∀R( fR→ (hR∧¬hR)) (and
Carnap does not give an argument for the latter). In fact, by Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem we know that this is false when the axiom system includes second-order
quantifiers: take f to be the conjunction of the (finitely many) second-order axioms of
PA2 together with a false-in-N-but-not-refutable sentence, such as ¬Con(PA2)). This
sentence is consistent but unsatisfiable, as Go¨del showed. Hence ∃R fR is false, and
so is ¬∃h∀R( fR→ (hR∧¬hR)), since the two are equivalent, as Carnap showed.
So, while provability (in particular, inconsistency) in our sense implies provability of
consequence (and inconsistency) in Carnap’s sense, unprovability (and consistency)
in our sense do not imply provable consequence (provable consistency) in Carnap’s.
In fact, full type theory is strong enough to prove ¬∃R fR.
As we have seen, there are a number of unclarities, gaps, and other problems in
Carnap’s approach to derivability. At this point, the question arises whether what he
did can be interpreted charitably, or can be reconstructed so that it becomes correct.
Compare here what Go¨del writes in the introduction to his dissertation:
If we replace the notion of logical consequence (that is, of being formally
provable in finitely many steps) by implication in Russell’s sense, more pre-
cisely, by formal implication, where the variables are the primitive notions of
the axiom system in question, then the existence of a model for a consistent
axiom system (now taken to mean one that implies no contradiction) follows
from the fact that a false proposition implies any other, hence also every con-
tradiction (whence the assertion follows at once by indirect argument). (Go¨del
1929, p. 63)
What Go¨del says here is correct, of course, but it is not quite what Carnap showed
(Go¨del credits the observation to Carnap): for ∃h . . . still does not—as pointed out
above—quantify over the possible consequences of the axioms, i.e., over formulas.
And even when the quantifier is given a substitutional reading, the possible values of
h are all expressions of type theory with only the variables in R free. (This is relevant
also in the case of the Gabelbarkeitssatz, see section 6 for more on this point.)
Overall, Carnap’s attempt to characterize provability in terms of (provability in type
theory of) a corresponding sentence expressing consequence fails. Once more, Car-
nap mistakenly assumed that unprovability (consistency) implied provability in type
theory of the negation of the corresponding sentence. He also mistakenly assumed
that what should be a meta-level quantification over formulas can be expressed on
the object level—in type theory—by a quantification over propositional functions.
Finally, there is a further difference between Carnap’s approach and the now common
one, a difference that relates to the implicit meta-level quantification over axiom sys-
tems. When proving completeness, say, we prove it for all axiom systems; and when
such a proof is formalized in a formal system (say, ZFC), the formalization contains a
quantifier over representations of axiom systems (or at least, representations of single
axioms). Carnap never does that—and this is noteworthy also for another reason. He
could have expressed his “completeness” theorem (that consistency implies satisfia-
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bility, in his sense of the terms) in a single sentence of type theory, viz.,
∀ f (¬∃h∀R( fR→ (hR∧¬hR))→∃R fR)
Moreover, his proof for it would have gone through. The fact that he did not do
that, despite the fact that he had no qualms about formalizing the quantification over
potential contradictions h in general, suggest that he might have had an inkling that
such a quantification is problematic.
6 Isomorphism and Carnap’s notion of “formality”
One important detail of Carnap’s Untersuchungen that has not yet received significant
attention in the literature is Carnap’s notion of formality (already mentioned above in
passing). Carnap motivates the need for this notion in Section 2.5.34 In order to prop-
erly capture independence from an axiom system, it must be possible to restrict the
propositional functions considered (as being a consequence of, as being inconsistent
with, or as being compatible with the axiom systems). The reason is that proposi-
tional functions in general can make reference to elements of the Grunddisziplin. For
instance, a propositional function hR may express “the field of R contains the num-
ber 20.” Then for any satisfiable axiom system fR, both hR and ¬hR are compatible
with fR, since any model of fR which contains 20 in the field of its relations is
isomorphic to one that does not. Hence, if no restriction is put on the propositional
function h, every axiom system is “forkable” by such an h. In addition, an axiom
system itself may make reference to the elements of the fields of its relations. As a
consequence, such an axiom system f may be satisfied by some model R1 but not by
another model R2 even when R1 and R2 are isomorphic.
Carnap’s main aim in Untersuchungen was a proof of his Gabelbarkeitssatz: every
monomorphic (categorical) axiom system is non-forkable, and conversely.35 Even for
just the left-to-right direction of this equivalence to hold, the scope of axioms systems
must be restricted to those that do not make reference to the specifics of the domain
they are describing (what Carnap calls their “Bestand”); and similarly for potential
forking sentences. As formalized today, this is done by restricting the language in
which the axiom system, on the one hand, and its potential consequences, on the
other hand, are formulated. Carnap’s definitions and results are schematic, i.e., he
gives instructions for how to express, e.g., that fR is monomorphic. But the sentence
in type theory that expresses that fact depends for its form on fR. In particular, this
sentence quantifies over the variables appearing in fR, and so the quantifier prefix
changes depending on the number, order, and types of the variables in fR. Such defi-
nitions could in principle be restricted to propositional functions fR that syntactically
do not contain certain elements, such as constants of the Grunddisziplin. However,
34 §2.5 of Carnap (1928/2000) is §15 in RC 080–34–04, p. 52ff.
35 See Awodey and Carus (2001) and Awodey and Reck (2002a) for further background.
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wherever Carnap needs quantification in type theory over propositional functions,
this is no longer possible. For example, in the definition of “ f is forkable,”
∃h(∃R( fR∧hR)∧∃S( fS∧¬hS) . . .),
the quantifier ∃h cannot be restricted to only h’s of a certain form, because it does not
actually quantify over expressions but over higher-type objects.
Carnap’s response to this problem is to define a property of axiom systems and of
their potential consequences meant to capture the idea that they should only specify
“structural” properties of their models, as opposed to “contentual” properties such as
whether 20 is a member of the domain or not. Given a propositional function fR, a
value of R of the correct types is an “admissibe model;” and it is a “model of fR”
if it is admissible and satisfies fR. Carnap now defines a propositional function to
be “formal” if every admissible model that is isomorphic to a model of fR is also a
model of fR. In type theory, this can be expressed by
For( f ) ≡ ∀P∀Q(( fP∧ Isoq(P,Q))→ fQ),
(see p. 124).36 Here Isoq(P,Q) is given by Carnap’s definition of q-level isomor-
phism of the models P and Q. (Carnap used this notion to define isomorphism of
models for arbitrary sequences of variables of arbitrary types, as discussed further
below.)
Carnap’s resulting restriction of his central theorems, especially the Gabelbarkeitssatz,
to formal axiom systems and formal consequences is essential to the proofs he gave
for them. In fact, they make these proofs almost trivial. For instance, Theorem 3.4.3 in
Untersuchungen, that every forkable axiom system is polymorphic (i.e., not monomor-
phic), is proved as follows:37 An axiom system f is forkable if there is a formal g such
that both g and ¬g are compatible with f . That is to say, there is a model P of f ∧g
and a model Q of f ∧¬g. In other words, P and Q are both models of f , P is a model
of g, and Q is a model of ¬g. Because g is formal, if P and Q were isomorphic, since
P is a model of g, Q would also have to be a model of g. And since Q is a model
of ¬g, P and Q are not isomorphic. The crucial fact used here is that, because g is
formal, if it is true in one model it is also true in any isomorphic one. Note that this
fact needs no proof here; it simply follows from the definition of “formal.”
Theorem 3.4.2, the converse direction of the Gabelbarkeitssatz, is more intricate.38
It states that every polymorphic axiom system is forkable. In its standard formula-
tion today—against which the “correctness” of Carnap’s result is often measured—
this claim depends crucially on the language in which the axiom system is formu-
lated. If the language is first-order, the corresponding claim is false: because of the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem, every first-order theory with infinite models has non-
isomorphic models, even when that theory is semantically complete (i.e., when every
sentence in the language is either a consequence of or inconsistent with it). But work-
ing along Carnap’s lines, there is no clear way in which the language of the axiom
36 RC 080–34-03, p. 75.
37 §26, Satz 3, RC 080–34–03, p. 86.
38 §26, Satz 2, RC 080–34–03, p. 86.
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system can be restricted to first-order. While we can consider a theory with only first-
order relations, the axioms themselves may always contain quantified variables of
arbitrary types. Once more, Carnap’s definition of an axiom system’s being forkable
is given in type theory itself:
∃h(For(h)∧∃R( fR∧hR)∧∃S( fS∧¬hS))
However, as was indicated by Awodey and Carus (2001) and Awodey and Reck (2002a),
the truth of this sentence does not imply the existence of a propositional function with
only the variables R free. Moreover, to prove it in type theory, it is not required to
exhibit such a propositional function, but only to show in type theory that a value of h
with the requisite properties exists.
Carnap’s actual proof of this questionable direction of the Gabelbarkeitssatz is a per-
fectly valid line of reasoning in type theory. He did, however, misunderstand and
overestimate its significance. Carnap begins by assuming the antecedent of the con-
ditional to be proved, i.e., that there are non-isomorphic models of f :
∃P∃Q( fP∧ fQ∧¬Iso(P,Q))
He then picks Iso(R,P) as the required h. If we insist on reading Carnap as attempt-
ing to prove a result for first-order logic, we would locate his mistake here: Iso(R,P)
is not a forking sentence of the required kind. That is, Iso(R,P) is not a formula in
which the only free variables are R. The problem is with the P: Either we think of
it syntactically, as a (sequence of) variable(s). But these occur in the scope of the
quantifier ∃P, and so do not have the same function when considered outside this
context. Or, we might take Carnap to be arguing semantically. In that case, P is not
a sequence of bound variables, but a value of such a sequence of variables and so not
properly “part of” h. However, if we work in type theory, as Carnap does, there is no
need to isolate the propositional function h. If there is a model P of f , then there is
a class of models isomorphic to P, and this is an admissible value of the higher-type
variable h. This value satisfies For(h), and that fact can be proved in type theory just
from the definition of h and For, without making use of the definition of Isoq. As P
is isomorphic to itself, and Q by assumption is not, hP and ¬hQ; so the sentence ex-
pressing that f is forkable follows. Note that the notion of isomorphism does almost
no work here. It is needed only to prove that P is isomorphic to itself, which is used
in the last step, as well as to establish that h is formal—but since formality is defined
in terms of isomorphism, that is also trivial.
We mentioned before that Carnap’s restriction on the definition of forkability relieves
him of the need to actually prove that isomorphic models satisfy the same proposi-
tional functions: this is because he only considered formal propositional functions,
for which this property holds by definition. But then, the direction of the Gabel-
barkeitssatz that remains true when re-interpreted using current definitions—namely
that isomorphic structures are equivalent in the sense of satisfying the same propo-
sitional functions—cannot directly be “extracted” from Carnap’s proofs. Indeed, this
claim is false given Carnap’s setup, because in the language of the Grunddisziplin
a propositional function may require its models to contain specific objects, e.g., the
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number 20, and so won’t be satisfied by a model that does not, even if that model is
isomorphic to a model that satisfies it.
In order to make the result true without the restriction to formal propositional func-
tions (which, again, makes the result true but trivial), one would have to restrict the
language of the Grunddisziplin. This is possible and, in fact, was done by Lindenbaum and Tarski
(1934/35). In contrast to Carnap, they were very clear on the distinction between the
correct result,
∀P∀Q(Iso(P,Q)→ hP≡ hQ)
where h is considered a schematic variable for propositional function expressions
with the right kind of restrictions, and the incorrect
∀h∀P∀Q(Iso(P,Q)→ hP≡ hQ)
As Lindenbaum and Tarski point out, the latter is not only not provable but refutable.
Why is that so? Because, again, type theory proves the existence of a value of h for
which it is false: Take the class of all models of the right type which contain 20 in the
field of one of its relations.
Neither direction of Carnap’s proofs of the Gabelbarkeitssatz actually made substan-
tive use of the general notion of isomorphism that Carnap defined. Nevertheless, it
is interesting to take a look at what his definition of isomorphism is. Although both
the term and the basic idea behind it predate Carnap’s discussion, it is instructive to
reconsider his attempt at a general definition for two reasons: First, it is, as far as we
know, the first attempt at defining this notion for higher type structures; and second,
it gives further insight into the notion of model at work in his writings.
The notion of isomorphism (and the crucial metalogical property based on it, namely
that of categoricity) goes back at least to Veblen (1904).39 Russell and Whitehead
defined isomorphisms between relations in Principia Mathematica, and the same
approach can be applied to the relations that constitute Carnap’s models of axiom
systems. This is, indeed, the insight from which Carnap proceeds. A relation isomor-
phism S between two relations R and R′, in the Russell-Whitehead sense, is a relation
which is one-one (i.e., bijective) and which has the property that whenever aRb there
are a′ and b′ so that aSa′, bSb′, and a′R′b′, as well as conversely. Note here that, in the
Russell-Whitehead theory, a relation R is given just by its graph: it is not specified
as a relation on some domain. Consequently, there can be no object that is part of
the “domain” of R but is not related to any object. Moreover, isomorphisms are not
required to relate any objects that do not participate in the relations R and R′.
If, as Carnap did and as was common at the time, one takes relations in this sense
to be the interpretations of the non-logical constants of an axiom system, it is never
necessary to also specify an individual domain for the models of the axiom system:
a model is simply all the relations that interpret the individual non-logical constants
taken together. This is, of course, closely related to the issue discussed above about
39 Compare Awodey and Reck (2002a) and the references in it.
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domain variability in Carnap’s general axiomatics. Indeed, for none of the axiom sys-
tems considered in Carnap’s Abriss, for instance, would it be necessary to entertain
the possibility of objects that are not in the fields of their relations. When quantifica-
tion over the domain is necessary, it is formalized using a relativized quantifier, where
the relativization clause uses either a primitive non-logical constant or a defined one,
e.g., restriction to the field of a primitive non-logical relation.
As Carnap wanted to provide a general theory of axiom systems in Untersuchungen,
he needed a general definition of when two models are isomorphic. No such general
definition had been given before.40 Hence Carnap had to provide one himself. For
axiom systems involving only one non-logical relation, the notion of relation isomor-
phism mentioned above suffices. But in the absence of a domain specification as part
of the model it is not straightforward to define a notion of model isomorphism for
multiple relations. If these relations are all just first-order, it suffices to require the
isomorphism S to preserve all the relations. Carnap does not do this directly. Instead,
he only requires that the relations of the two models are pairwise isomorphic, as well
as that the individual relation isomorphisms agree on the intersection of the fields of
those relations.
Carnap may have intended this only as a first stab at a definition, to be improved later
on; but it also reflects a limitation of the type system with which Carnap is working
(which, admittedly, does not yet appear if all relations are first order). For instance, if
the axiom system contains a one-place first-order predicate constant P(0) and a one-
place second-order predicate constant Q((0)), then the values of the corresponding
variables are a class of individuals and a class of classes of individuals. But because
types are not cumulative in Carnap’s system, no relation can be a bijection with a
field that contains both individuals and classes, i.e., no single S can be a relation
isomorphism between both P and Q.
A natural solution to this difficulty caused by Carnap’s type system is to require one
isomorphism for P and another for Q. Of course, this will not do yet, as Carnap
explains himself. Merely relating the classes falling under Q in one model with those
falling under Q in the other model is not enough: the classes themselves must be
isomorphic. Carnap accomplishes this in Untersuchungen by using his definition of
a q-correlator, i.e., a relation isomorphism for relations of q-th order. Moreover, the
isomorphisms for the individual variables must also match up with each other. Carnap
accomplishes the latter by requiring a q-isomorphism between models to be a single
relation on individuals that is a q-correlator for each qth order relation in the model.
The resulting definition is more general, as well as correct.
The first time the notion of isomorphism for higher-type models is considered in print
appears to be in Tarski (1935). However, it is not defined in nearly as much detail there
as in Carnap’s Untersuchungen. The same definition occurs also in Lindenbaum and Tarski
40 Typically isomorphisms of models was discussed only for models of a particular axiom systems,
and often these only contained a single non-logical primitive. For instance, Veblen (1904) considered
a version of geometry where the single primitive is a three-place collinearity predicate relating points.
Neumann (1925) also discussed the (non)categoricity of his axiom system; but his axioms were formulated
in German and both what counts as a model and what counts as an isomorphism was left vague.
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(1934/35), and there it coincides with Carnap’s.41 The similarity of Carnap’s and
Tarski’s approaches to isomorphism does not stop there. In fact, Tarski’s project of a
general metamathematics of deductive systems in the 1930s is similar to Carnap’s in
many other respects as well. Tarski carries out his general investigations of “deductive
systems”, i.e., axiom systems, in a metatheory similar to Carnap’s: the simple theory
of types. An axiom system for Tarski, as for Carnap, is a propositional function in the
sense discussed above.
Indeed, as late as 1940 Tarski writes the following:
Let us consider a system of non-logical sentences and let, for instance “C1”,
“C2”, . . . , “Cn” be all the nonlogical constants which occur. If we replace these
constants by variables “X1”, “X2”, . . . , “Xn” our sentences are transformed
into sentential functions with n free variables and we can say that these func-
tions express certain relations between n objects or certain conditions to be
fulfilled by n objects. Now we call a system of n objects O1, O2, . . . , On a
model of the considered system of sentences if these objects really fulfill all
conditions expressed in the obtained sentential functions. [. . . ] We now say
that a given sentence is a logical consequence of the system of sentences if
every model of the system is likewise a model of this sentence. (Tarski 1940)
This is the very same definition that Tarski gave in his seminal paper on logical con-
sequence five years earlier (1936).42 In his 1940 talk Tarski goes on to define cate-
goricity in the same way in which Carnap defined monomorphicity:
In order to obtain the second variant of the concept of categoricity, we shall
confine ourselves for the sake of simplicity, to such a case in which the consid-
ered system of sentences is finite and contains only one nonlogical constant,
say “C”. Let “P(C)” represent the logical product of all these sentences. “C”
can denote, for instance, a class of individuals, or a relation between individu-
als, or a class of such classes or relations etc. [. . . ] We can now correlate with
the semantical sentence stating that our system of sentences is semantically
categorical an equivalent sentence formulated in the language of the deductive
theory itself. This is the following sentence [. . . ] in symbols:
∀X∀Y (P(X)∧P(Y )→ X ∼ Y )
41 It coincides, that is, except for a difference Tarski stresses: his definition requires the isomorphism to
be a bijection of the entire domain of individuals, not of just of individuals “used” in the model.
42 It bears emphasizing here that, while in that paper Tarski alluded to Go¨delian arithmetization of syn-
tax, he did so only in order to explain how derivability from the axioms of a formal system according to
given rules can be formalized in metalogic; but this did not play a role in his definition of consequence.
In particular, Tarski did not give a uniform definition of “follows from” for an object language in a formal
metalanguage which can refer to and quantify over all models and expressions, in contrast to his general
definition of truth. Of course, Tarski’s discussion of consequence goes much beyond Carnap’s and is more
nuanced in other respects, e.g., in its considerations of the distinction between derivability and conse-
quence, in terms of which constants should count as logical, etc. He was able to accomplish that because
Go¨del had in the meantime identified the gap between what follows from and what can be derived from
deductive theories. Tarski was also prompted to do it by Carnap’s Logical Syntax.
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Now we say that the considered system of sentences is categorical with re-
spect to its logical basis . . . if the sentence formulated above is logically valid.43
By this time—due to Go¨del’s seminal work, but also Carnap’s contributions—the
need for a proper way of talking about expressions of the axiom system in a metalan-
guage, in which general questions about axiomatic systems are pursued (in particular,
quantification over such expressions to properly express derivability, consistency, and
completeness), was clear, and the proper solution (arithmetization) was properly un-
derstood as well. At the same time, what is evident from Tarski’s writings on the
subject into the 1940s is that a mature approach of model theory was not yet avail-
able; semantics was done very much in the way Carnap had proposed.
7 a- and k-concepts
As we saw earlier, Carnap’s attempt to justify his identification of provability with
(the derivability in type theory of) his statement expressing consequence was un-
successful. The problem here extends to his notion of consistency. Carnap does not
properly locate the relevant definitions in the metalanguage (so as to use an inductive,
syntactic notion of proof). Hence his proof of “completeness” does not establish the
connection we expect today from such a theorem, namely one between proof theory
and model theory. At best, that proof can be seen as an attempt to show that the exis-
tence of a model for an axiom system is equivalent, in type theory, to the absence of a
contradiction that is a consequence of the axioms. Carnap’s approach also remained
an unsuccessful attempt due to the problematic nature of the type-theoretic quantifi-
cation over propositional functions required for formulating “there is a contradiction
which follows from the axiom system”.
Having said that, Carnap was well aware of the difference between there being such
a contradiction and actually having found one. This difference loomed large in the
foundational debate between Hilbertian “formalists” and Brouwerian intuitionists at
the time. Carnap attempted to capture it, and to do justice to it within his general
axiomatics, by distinguishing “a-concepts” from “k-concepts.” The latter are “con-
structive [konstruktiv]” in the sense that they require either a witness or a procedure
to identify a witness; the former are “absolutist” in the sense that they only require
the truth of an existential claim but not an actual witness. Carnap’s a-concepts can be
inter-related within type theory by considering corresponding conditional sentences.
(It can be proved that they are related in certain ways by proving those sentences type-
theoretically.) For instance, he is able to prove the equivalence of “a-consistent” and
“a-satisfied” along such lines: the sentences ∃R fR and¬∃h∀R( fR→ (hR∧¬hR))
are provably equivalent in type theory.44
k-Concepts can also be so related, at least in some cases. For that purpose, Carnap
has to pick what he calls a “criterion” for a particular k-concept to apply. In the case
43 Tarski uses X ∼ Y as an abbreviation for the the isomorphism relation.
44 We leave aside here, once again, the problems arising from taking ∃h to correctly express the existence
of a formula (“propositional function” in that sense).
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of concepts involving existential claims, Carnap chooses as criterion being able to ex-
hibit witnesses. For instance, an axiom system is k-satisfied if a model can be exhib-
ited, and it is k-inconsistent if a propositional function h can be given that is provably
formal and for which both ∀R( fR→ hR) and ∀R( fR→¬hR) are provable. When
the k-concept involves a general claim, Carnap requires that the formula expressing it
is provable in type theory. Thus, an axiom system is k-empty if ¬∃R fR is provable,
and it is k-consistent if ¬∃h∀R( fR → (hR∧¬hR)) is provable. It follows—and
Carnap acknowledges this explicitly—that even when a partition into a-concepts is
exhaustive (e.g., every axiom system is either a-satisfied or a-empty), the correspond-
ing k-concepts do not necessarily form an exhaustive disjunction: e.g., an axiom sys-
tem is neither k-satisfied nor k-inconsistent if we neither have a model nor a proof of
a contradiction.
When Carnap considers a- and k-concepts in parallel, he usually compares how prop-
erties of axiomatic systems can be defined classically and how they can be defined
intuitionistically, as well as which results can be established classically and which
intuitionistically.45 In these comparisons, he comes close to making a distinction that
we now consider natural and important for metalogic: that between truth and prov-
ability. However, he does not quite get there. Even though, e.g., the definition of k-
inconsistency involves provability of a contradiction, it requires more than our notion
of inconsistency: in line with an intuitionistic (constructive) interpretation, the contra-
diction must actually be exhibited. More importantly, the k-concepts corresponding to
complements of a-concepts are not the complements of the corresponding k-concepts.
This is so because the constructive interpretations of properties of axiom systems
involving general claims require the provability in type theory of the sentences ex-
pressing that an axiom system has those properties (see above). For example, while
our notion of consistency only requires the absence of a proof of a contradiction,
Carnap’s k-consistency requires a proof in type theory of this absence.
Carnap realized that k-consistency does not imply k-satisfaction, i.e., provability
of
¬∃h∀R( fR→ (hR∧¬hR))
does not imply that a model can be explicitly given. He could also have considered the
question of whether k-consistency implies a-satisfiability, or more generally, the rela-
tionship between k-concepts and corresponding a-concepts. He did not do so, perhaps
because he assumed considerations involving a-concepts and k-concepts, while par-
allel, to be independent, or maybe because it is obvious that a k-concept implies the
corresponding a-concept but never vice versa. From today’s perspective, the interest-
ing cases are those that involve the relations between the mere failure of a k-concept
to apply and the opposite k- or a-concept. For example, completeness (in our sense) is
the question of whether an axiom system that is not k-inconsistent is k-satisfied or at
45 Behmann suggested that Carnap remain neutral between the absolutist and constructivist approaches
(Behmann to Carnap, March 6, 1929, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Nachlaß 335 (Behmann), K. 1 I 10).
The first part (pp. 1–34) of Carnap’s typescript RC 080–34–02 apparently is a revised version dating from
after Behmann’s letter: it does not bear Behmann’s marginal annotations which are present on the rest of
the typescript, and the version to which Behmann responded had §10 covering pp. 31–35, while in the
surviving typescript §10 covers pp. 30–35.
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least a-satisfied. These, however, are simply not natural questions to ask in Carnap’s
framework, since they require a clearer distinction between proving things from and
proving things about axiom systems in the Grunddisziplin.
Nevertheless, Carnap’s discussion of k-concepts is illuminating with respect to his
notion of “decidability [Entscheidungsdefinitheit]”. This notion is reminiscent of our
notion of semantic completeness for theories, as we saw above, and his corresponding
k-notion is related to both decidability and syntactic completeness of theories. Carnap
defines an axiom system f to be a-decidable as follows:
∃R∧∀g(For(g)→∀R( fR→ gR)∨∀R( fR→¬gR))
This is provably equivalent, within type theory, to f being non-forkable. The intent of
this definition is that every formal statement is either a consequence of the axioms or
its negation is. It differs from our notion of semantic completeness in that the ∀g quan-
tifier is problematic as a formalization of “for all formulas” (see above), also in that
h is allowed to be any propositional function of type theory (not just, say, first order
formulas in the language of f ). Whereas in other cases of general properties Carnap
adopts provability in type theory as the criterion for the k-concept, here he defines it
thus: “If a model of f can be exhibited, and a procedure can be given, according to
which, for every given formal g (with the same variables), either a proof of f → g or
a proof of f →¬g can be carried out in finitely many steps.” The resulting notion is,
as Carnap points out, not coextensive with k-monomorphicity or k-nonforkability. He
also claims that this is the notion that is usually meant when other authors at the time
write about decidability. Moreover, in contrast to monomorphicity, no axiom systems
were known to be k-decidable to him, nor was it clear whether any axiom systems
ever would be shown to be k-decidable or not.
This latter claim may seem puzzling. After all, Langford’s proof of the decidability
of theories of order (from 1927) was already published at the time . It is possible
that Carnap simply did not know about Langford’s work,46 But even if he did, he
would not have recognized it as providing a decision procedure for establishing k-
decidability for axiom systems of order, since Langford only showed that the axioms
settle the truth values of first-order propositional functions involving the same vari-
ables as the axiom system. We now take it for granted that this is the question to
be settled; but at the time Carnap was writing, the almost universal restriction to
first-order languages that we typically assume was still some way off. Certainly for
Carnap, but also for most of his contemporaries, logic was still higher-order, and
the consequences of the axiom systems of interest included their higher-order conse-
quences.47
Another reason for why the claim above may seem puzzling is the following: Carnap
himself stresses that some axiom systems are known to be k-monomorphic, i.e., in
46 Carnap does not mention Langford’s work himself. It is mentioned by Fraenkel (1928), although not
in the context of completeness or decidability of axiom systems.
47 Note that many of the axiom systems in Abriss involve higher-order axioms, even primitives or im-
portant defined concepts that are higher order. For instance, the axiom system for geometry in §34 has a
second-order primitive ger, for the class of lines, which are themselves classes of points.
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type theory provably monomorphic, and hence, provably non-forkable by any formal
sentence (not just first-order sentences). Consequently, a simple decision procedure
would be to conduct an exhaustive search of all proofs in type theory until a proof of
either f → g or f →¬g is found. Although this approach seems obvious to us today,
it was far from obvious at the time. For instance, Bernays (1930, p. 366) explicitly
considers this approach and rejects it in the following passage:
Notice that this requirement of being deductively closed [i.e., every statement
that can be formulated within the framework of the theory is either provable
or refutable] does not go as far as the requirement that every question of the
theory be decidable. The latter says that there should be a procedure for de-
ciding for any arbitrarily given pair of contradictory claims belonging to the
theory which of the two is provable (“correct”).
The much more inclusive range of consequences of axioms that Carnap considers
(in full type theory) also plays an important role in his discussion of the relation-
ship between the k-decidability of axiom systems and the logical decision problem
in sections 3.7 and 3.8 of Untersuchungen. The latter is the question of whether
there is a procedure which decides for each sentence of logic (i.e., type theory) af-
ter finitely many steps whether the sentence is provable or not. As is well known,
Hilbert considered this problem one of the main open problems of logic (Hilbert
1928; Hilbert and Ackermann 1928) and he was optimistic that a positive solution
was forthcoming. This optimism was not universally shared, however; Carnap cites
Weyl (1925) to that effect. If the logical decision problem was solved positively,
Carnap argues in section 3.7 of Untersuchungen,48 every monomorphic axiom sys-
tem would be k-decidable. In that event, k-decidability would be coextensive with
monomorphicity, and thus, according to Carnap, not independently useful, since it
does not result in a new division of axiom systems into two classes.
As long as this problem is not solved positively, i.e., as long as there are undecided
logical sentences, no axiom system is k-decidable. This is so because the undecided
logical sentence r yields, for each axiom system f , a propositional function g which
likewise is undecided. (Recall here that being k-decidable depends not only on the
existence of a decision procedure, but on such a decision procedure being known—in
keeping with the intuitionistic interpretation of k-decidability.) Take any formula h
which is a consequence of f , such as f itself if f is formal, or a tautology involving
only the variables in f . Then gR= hR∧ r follows from f if r holds, and ¬h follows
from f iff r does not hold. In fact, type theory proves
∃R fR→ [∀R( fR→ hR)↔ r]
Thus the exhibition of a model for f together with a decision procedure that yields a
proof either of ∀R( fR→ gR) or of ∀R( fR→¬gR) in type theory would yield a
proof of r or ¬r in type theory.
As with other issues tackled by Carnap in the Untersuchungen, his considerations
about decidability, as well as his distinction between absolutist and constructive ver-
48 §29 of RC 080–34–03, p. 98ff.
30 Georg Schiemer et al.
sions of metalogical notions, remained fundamentally flawed. They do, nevertheless,
reveal significant insight into the subtleties involved, and they constitute a valiant
effort to address them with the tools Carnap had available.
8 Conclusion
In light of our discussion in the previous sections, we are left with a mixed assess-
ment of Carnap’s early metatheoretic work. Earlier criticisms of it (e.g. by Coffa and
Hintikka) did miss their mark in various ways, since they were too coarse-grained
and dismissive. Nevertheless, Carnap’s approach was limited in several important re-
spects, as our discussion also made evident. To assess Carnap’s place in the history
of logic properly, an account that balances both sides is needed.
On the positive side, Carnap addressed and made progress with a considerable num-
ber of problems in Untersuchungen and Abriss. First of all, notions such as conse-
quence, isomorphism, categoricity, and completeness were not clearly defined at the
time and he made steps towards making them precise. Moreover, he did so by using
the best tools available to him, namely simple (or deramified) type theory. Second,
Carnap began to work out ideas appropriate to the model-theoretic character of these
notions. In particular, he was aware of the kind of domain variation underlying them.
His explication of that idea looks unsatisfactory from today’s perspective. But again,
it was arguably the most promising route to take given the state of the development
of logic at the time. For these reasons, it seems fair to say that Carnap anticipated
the kind of formal reasoning about models with which we are now familiar in sub-
stantive ways; he thus provided an early, noteworthy form of model theory within a
type-theoretic setting. Third, he was sensitive to open problems in the foundations
of mathematics at the time, e.g., the distinction between “absolute” and “construc-
tive” concepts, and he tried to give a precise characterization of them as well. Fourth,
in his discussion of the different completeness properties of axiom systems, Carnap
asked fruitful questions and tried to prove important theorems, including the Gabel-
barkeitssatz.
On the negative side, there are also several aspects in which Carnap’s attempts re-
mained unsuccessful, even by his own lights. He discussed provability as a meta-
theoretic notion defined “outside” the framework of type theory, but his erroneous
proof that provability and consequence coincide prevented him from fully grasping
the problems posed by decidability. The axiom systems he considered, as well as his
model-theoretic definitions of consequence, satisfaction, etc., are specified in the ob-
ject language. As we saw, this is not outright impossible, and with Tarski he was in
good company in using this approach. Yet it does have implications of which Car-
nap was not aware in 1928–29 and which limit the importance of his results. Second,
some of the notions discussed in his Untersuchungen manuscript are too general to
be useful, as later developments made clear. This concerns, for instance, his notion of
formality, which is replaced today by specific language restrictions. A third problem
Carnap’s approach faces is that some of the central concepts underlying his general
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axiomatics project are left underspecified and, thus, largely unexplored. This con-
cerns especially the nature of his “basic discipline”, including notions such as truth
and provability, but also the relationship between absolute and constructive metathe-
oretic concepts, and in particular, between a-forkability and k-decidability.
Several issues concerning Carnap’s early metatheory remain in need of further ex-
ploration. One of them is the influence Carnap’s work on general axiomatics, and his
Untersuchungen in particular, had on the historical development of logic: How, more
broadly and in more depth, do his contributions relate to work by Tarski, Hilbert,
Bernays, and Go¨del, and other central figures?49 A second issue concerns Carnap’s
own intellectual development: Are there points of contact or continuity between his
early model theory, as discussed in the present paper, and, e.g., his “official” work on
semantics from the 1940s? Third, more questions can be raised about the remaining
significance of Carnap early metatheory from a technical point of view. This con-
cerns the Gabelbarkeitssatz, in particular, including recent research on the so-called
“Fraenkel-Carnap property” for second-order theories stimulated by it. The latter has
led to some interesting partial results already, i.e., to the identification of several
mathematical theories that have this metatheoretic property.50 Finally, Carnap’s con-
jecture that (higher-order) theories are categorical if and only if they are semantically
complete has still not been decided in general; it thus remains “one of the leading
open questions in higher-order axiomatics” (Awodey and Reck 2002a, p. 84).
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